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Abstract 
In this paper we provide an empirical assessment of two of the measures 
proposed in the context of the European Single Market, namely, easing the provision of 
domestic and foreign services, and modifying the rules of public procurement, for the 
case of Spain. We build and simulate a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, 
which incorporates three particular features: (i) increasing returns to scale and a non-
competitive price rule; (ii) sectoral export demand functions; and (iii) equilibrium 
unemployment according to a matching function approach. 
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1. Introduction 
In the mid-1980s the European Communities (now European Union, EU) launched the 
so called Single Market Programme (SMP henceforth), with the aim of eliminating any 
existing barriers to the mobility of goods, services, labour, and capital (Commission of 
the European Communities, 1985). The Programme, to be completed by January 1st, 
1993, envisaged the elimination of those trade barriers still remaining despite the 
completion of the customs union: i.e., fiscal barriers, quantitative barriers, market 
access restrictions directed at firms from other member countries (and, in particular, 
public procurement), customs formalities, technical regulations, etc. The SMP also 
contemplated some measures aimed to promote an increased competition. An overview 
of the SMP can be seen in Flam (1992). 
 
Despite the important progress attained, after ten years there still remain several 
restrictions, which put a limit to the full operation of a common market for goods and 
factors within the EU. In general, the areas where the SMP rules have not been entirely 
fulfilled are those related to technical barriers to the exchange of goods, restrictions in 
public procurement, and obstacles to the free movement of services (European 
Commission, 2003). Hence, since barriers to a full common market in the EU still 
remain, some new directives aimed to implement the principles of the SMP are 
currently being developed. Accordingly, the need for further assessments of the SMP is 
still in order, which would be particularly relevant in some areas such as the single 
market for services, or the regulation of public procurement. In addition, there are no 
many assessments available of these issues in the context of the SMP; we just can quote 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) and Kox et al. (2004) on trade services liberalization, 
and COWI (2003) on public procurement. 
 
On the other hand, the Spanish economy can represent an interesting case of 
study for the effects of the SMP, due to several reasons. First, Spain can be considered a 
medium-size economy, given the size of her main macroeconomic variables, which has 
experienced a process of rapid growth in the last forty years, starting from a relatively 
weak position as compared to the rest of Western European countries. This has been 
particularly true after her accession to the EU in 1986, allowing her an even deeper 
integration with other more advanced economies, so Spain has been able to join the 
Economic and Monetary Union from its start. Further on, a new assessment of the SMP 
effects would have an additional interest in the Spanish case, since Spain would be one 
of the four more restrictive EU members regarding international trade in services (Kox 
et al., 2004). In sum, the Spanish experience could be of interest for other medium-size 
economies expected to follow a process of integration with other relatively more 
advanced countries. 
 
In this paper we provide an empirical assessment of two of the measures 
proposed in the context of the SMP, namely, easing the provision of domestic and 
foreign services, and modifying the rules of public procurement, for the case of Spain. 
As mentioned above, these are probably the areas where further advancements in the 
implementation of the SMP are still needed (European Commission, 2002, 2004). We 
do this by means of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model simulated for the 
Spanish economy, which provides a more complete analysis, as compared to partial 
equilibrium models; see Shoven and Whalley (1992) for a survey of this kind of models. 
This methodology, on the other hand, has not been applied before to assess the effects 
of the SMP on the Spanish economy, with the only exception of Gómez-Plana (1998) 
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and Bajo-Rubio and Gómez-Plana (2000), who focus instead on the measures 
implemented in the first stage of the SMP (i.e., removal of trade barriers, decrease in 
transport costs, and harmonization of technical barriers).  
 
We will build a CGE model, which is an extension of Gómez-Plana (1998) and 
Bajo-Rubio and Gómez-Plana (2000, 2004), and incorporates three particular features: 
(i) increasing returns to scale and a non-competitive price rule; (ii) sectoral export 
demand functions; and (iii) equilibrium unemployment according to a matching 
function approach. Notice that these assumptions would be justified from recent 
empirical work on the Spanish economy. So, for instance, Siotis (2003) estimates 
sectoral markups for a large firm-level data set encompassing all sectors of economic 
activity apart from financial institutions, and finds significant values in most cases. On 
the other hand, Moreno (1997) estimates export demand functions for a set of Spanish 
manufacturing sectors, obtaining evidence against the small country assumption for four 
of them: Energy, Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products, Metal products 
(including machinery and equipment), and Other manufactures. Finally, assuming full 
employment would be quite unrealistic for the Spanish economy, and the matching 
function approach seems to work reasonably well in the simulations of Bajo-Rubio and 
Gómez-Plana (2004). 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The setup of the model is presented 
in section 2, the empirical analysis and results are discussed in section 3, and section 4 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
The model of this paper is static, and describes a single open economy, disaggregated in 
thirteen production sectors, with fourteen consumption goods, a single representative 
consumer, a public sector, and a rest of the world. The equilibrium of the economy 
involves three conditions simultaneously: zero-profit in all activities; market-clearing in 
goods and capital markets; and some constraints related to the macroeconomic closure, 
disposable income, and unemployment. In this section we present a brief description of 
the model; the full set of equations can be seen in the Appendix. 
 
2. 1. Production 
Production is based on a nested technology of intermediate inputs, capital, and labour. 
The firm’s problem consists of maximizing profits (or, alternatively, minimizing costs, 
in the dual approach) subject to the technology constraint. The unit cost functions are 
obtained from this firm’s problem, and are then used in the zero-profit conditions. In 
turn, the demands for factors and intermediate inputs come from the application of 
Shepard’s lemma on cost functions, and are later used in the goods’ and factors’ market-
clearing equations. 
 
There are many well-known approaches to modelling competition among firms 
in CGE models, in addition to the more common assumption of perfect competition; 
see, e.g., Francois and Roland-Holst (1997), Hoffmann (2002) or Willenbockel (2004). 
However, a trade-off between theoretical complexity and empirical data availability is 
always present, since the lack of data usually prevents implementing many imperfect 
competition specifications, or forces oneself to using inadequate data (such as 
aggregated figures, old data, or from other countries), which has been a common 
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critique to deterministic CGE models. For these reasons, we have opted for representing 
competition among firms in the following way. 
 
The model incorporates increasing returns to scale and a non-competitive pricing 
rule, due to the existence of some fixed costs on both labour and capital. The presence 
of fixed costs means that average costs are higher than marginal costs, so that firms set 
prices by charging a markup on marginal costs. This pricing rule is based on the 
assumption that firms face demand functions with negative slopes, and compete à la 
Cournot. There is free entry and exit of firms in each sector, so that in equilibrium firms 
just break even. 
 
The non-competitive pricing rule is obtained from the first-order condition of the 
firm’s problem described above, leading to a markup described by the Lerner index. 
The calibrated markup for sector i is: 
ii
i
i ELASN
MARKUP
Ω
=  
where the price-cost margin MARKUPi depends on: (i) the conjectural variations 
parameter, Ωi; (ii) the share of a typical firm in sector i’s output, equal to the inverse of 
the number of firms in each sector, Ni; and (iii) the perceived elasticity of demand faced 
by sector i, ELASi. In the empirical application, Ωi = 1, since firms compete à la 
Cournot; Ni is proxied by the Herfindahl index on concentration, under the assumption 
of symmetrical firms (see section 3.1); and ELASi is proxied by ( ) iAiAi θσ−+σ 1 , where 
A
iσ  is the Armington elasticity, and θi is the output share of sector i on total output 
(Willenbockel, 2004). 
 
2. 2. Consumption 
There is a representative household behaving as a rational consumer. The level of 
consumer’s wealth is determined by the endowments of capital and labour, jointly with 
exogenous net transfers paid by the public sector. The fixed endowment of labour 
should be interpreted as a maximum supply of labour since leisure and unemployment 
are assumed to be endogenous. Hence, labour supply would be elastic up to the 
endowment constraint. 
 
The household’s decision problem consists of choosing her optimal consumption 
bundle, by maximizing a nested utility function subject to a budget constraint. 
Preferences are represented by a nested utility function on savings, leisure, and 
(consumption of) goods. Notice that, given our static approach, we consider a unit 
elasticity of substitution between (consumption of) goods and savings (Howe, 1975), so 
that savings can be interpreted as the purchase of bonds for future consumption. The 
budget constraint includes total factor rents jointly with exogenous net transfers paid by 
the public sector, less exogenous income taxes. Demand functions for savings, leisure, 
and goods, are derived from the first-order conditions, and are included in the goods and 
labour market-clearing conditions, as well as in the macroeconomic closure for savings. 
 
2. 3. Public sector 
The role of the public sector in the model is twofold, i.e., owner of resources (e.g. from 
capital endowment and tax revenue), and purchaser of certain goods; in addition, it also 
determines the policy rules. As a resources owner, its wealth includes income from 
capital rents, net transfers paid to the representative household and received from the 
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rest of the world, and tax revenues. Taxes consist of social contributions paid by 
employers and employees, value added taxes, other net indirect taxes, and income taxes. 
All taxes are modelled as effective ad valorem rates calibrated from benchmark data, 
except for income taxes that are taken as an exogenous fixed amount. In order to isolate 
any bias from the public sector on results, ad valorem tax rates are allowed to change 
endogenously under the equal yield assumption. 
  
The public sector also enters the model as a purchaser. The public sector 
expenditure includes both market (i.e., output that is disposed of in the market at 
economically significant prices) and non-market goods (i.e., output that is provided at 
prices that are not economically significant).  
 
2. 4. Foreign sector 
The model incorporates the large open economy assumption for the exports of the 
manufacturing sectors, and the small open economy assumption for the exports of the 
remaining sectors, as well as for imports. On the one hand, some market power would 
appear for certain manufacturing goods sold to the rest of the world, for which the 
country would behave as a price-setter, and this has been implemented by including 
export demand functions. On the other hand, the economy would face a perfectly elastic 
export supply function (i.e., exogenous world prices) for the rest of sectors, where a 
constant elasticity of transformation function between domestic and foreign sales is 
used. Regarding imports, we assume that goods are differentiated according to their 
origin (i.e., domestic or foreign), following Armington’s assumption (Armington, 
1969), which allows for the possibility of intra-industry trade despite the assumption of 
exogenous world prices.  
 
The foreign sector is closed by assuming that the difference between receipts 
and payments from the rest of the world is exogenous. This restriction would avoid, 
e.g., a permanent increase in exports with no change in imports, an unlikely scenario 
since it would involve an unlimited capital inflow to the country. 
 
2. 5. Factor markets 
Two factors enter into the model: capital and labour. With respect to capital, both the 
representative household and the public sector own fixed endowments. The capital rents 
adjust to clear the domestic capital market, under the assumptions of capital 
international immobility and perfect mobility across domestic sectors. The only owner 
of labour is the representative household. As explained in section 2.2, the demand for 
leisure is derived from the household’s problem. Hence, labour supply (i.e., the labour 
endowment less the demand for leisure) would be elastic up to the fixed amount of 
labour. In the same way as capital, labour is assumed to be international immobile, but 
mobile within the country.  
 
We assume the presence of equilibrium unemployment along with a matching 
function approach, following Pissarides (2000) and Balistreri (2002). A matching rule 
gives the number of jobs as a function of the number of workers looking for a job (i.e., 
the unemployed), and the number of firms looking for workers (i.e., the vacancies). 
Firms and workers are assumed to spend some resources before job creation and 
production take place. Therefore, real wages net of taxes (W) include a premium (1/H) 
on reservation wages (W0) that represents search costs: 
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WW 10=  
In turn, the H-functions (i.e., the inverse of the premium) have properties similar to 
those of the matching functions: 
( ) 101 ηη 
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
−=
U
U
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LDUH  
where a bar denotes the benchmark value for the referred variable, U is the 
unemployment rate, LD is the aggregate demand for labour, η0 is the elasticity with 
respect to labour demand (measuring the positive externality from firms to workers), 
and η1 is the elasticity with respect to unemployment (measuring the positive externality 
from workers to firms). Labour demand is used as a proxy for vacancies, as in Balistreri 
(2002). 
 
2. 6. Macroeconomic closure for investment and savings 
Following Dervis et al. (1981), total investment is split into sectoral gross capital 
formation using a fixed-coefficients Leontief structure. Notice that, in our static 
framework, investment shows its influence on the economy as a component of final 
demand. The model embodies a macroeconomic closure equation stating that 
investment and (private, public, and foreign) savings are equal. 
 
2. 7. Equilibrium conditions 
The equilibrium of the economy is a set of prices and an allocation of goods and factors 
that solves simultaneously three sets of equations: 
• Zero-profit conditions for all sectors. 
• Market-clearing in goods and factor markets. 
• Constraints on disposable income (that must equal expenditures for all agents), 
equilibrium unemployment, and macroeconomic closure of the model. 
 
Finally, the model is solved using Rutherford’s (1999) method, based on 
Mathiesen (1985), which treats general equilibrium models as mixed complementarity 
problems, and is implemented in the empirical application using GAMS/MPSGE. A 
description of the calibration procedure can be found in Dawkins et al. (2001). 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis and results 
3. 1. Calibration and data  
The model presented in the previous section has been calibrated using Spanish data. The 
main data set is the Spanish Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), elaborated by Uriel et al. 
(2005) from the Spanish National Accounts and Household Budget Survey, and 
reshaped to fit our model following the methodology explained in Gómez-Plana (2001). 
Elasticities are taken from econometric evidence: elasticities of substitution between 
labour and capital, and Armington elasticities come from GTAP (Hertel, 1997); 
elasticities of transformation come from de Melo and Tarr (1992); and the elasticity of 
substitution between leisure and consumption has been obtained using the procedure of 
Ballard et al. (1985), from the uncompensated elasticity of labour supply estimated by 
García and Molina (1998). Finally, the elasticities of the matching function are taken 
from Burda and Wyplosz (1994), the elasticities of the export demand function from 
Moreno (1997), and the Herfindahl indices on concentration from Bajo-Rubio and Salas 
(1998). We use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as numeraire. 
6 
 
3. 2. Scenarios and simulations 
As mentioned in the Introduction, we will simulate in our CGE model the effects of two 
of the measures proposed in the context of the SMP, namely, easing the provision of 
domestic and foreign services, and modifying the rules of public procurement. Recall 
that these are probably the areas where further advancements in the implementation of 
the SMP are still needed. It is important to notice that we are not trying to quantify 
exactly the effects of the particular policy measures considered, on the performance of 
the Spanish economy. More precisely, our objective will be trying to identify the main 
trends followed by some relevant variables after the policy shock, together with the 
major mechanisms influencing them. 
 
Concerning the removal of barriers on services, the European Commission has 
proposed in 2004 a Directive to ease the freedom of establishment for service providers 
and the free movement of services within the EU. According to Copenhagen Economics 
(2005), this Directive would reduce the existing barriers to the provision of services by 
more than 50%. Three sectors (Business services, Communication services, and 
Wholesale and retail trade; SMP sectors henceforth) would be explicitly under the rules 
of the Directive. In Copenhagen Economics (2005), tariff equivalents (i.e., the 
percentage impacts on prices) are estimated for these three sectors, for two types of 
barriers: rent-creating barriers, which reduce competition on raising prices above 
marginal costs, and so generating rents to the incumbent firms; and cost-creating 
barriers, which increase the use of real resources. These tariff equivalents, both at its 
benchmark level and a post-Directive simulation, are shown in Table 1.  
 
In the empirical application below, barriers on services have been modelled as 
ad valorem tariff equivalents (see Table 1). Then, the removal of these barriers has been 
simulated in the following way: through an exogenous fall in the markup over costs, 
i.e., the wedge between producer prices and producer costs, in the case of rent-creating 
barriers; and through an exogenous increase in productivity, in the sense that a greater 
amount of output can be produced using the same amount of inputs, in the case of cost-
creating barriers.  
 
On the other hand, according to European Commission (2004), public 
procurement prices paid by public authorities would be lower when the EU directives 
were applied. In particular, the simulations performed in COWI (2003) show that the 
price of those purchases where directives on public procurement were not applied, 
would have been around 40% higher than otherwise. We have simulated a quantitative 
equivalent expenditure cut in public procurement, when purchasing the same physical 
amount of goods and services, using as benchmark the figures on public expenditure 
shown in the Spanish SAM of Uriel et al. (2005).  
 
Summarizing, our simulation of the above SMP policies will be presented in 
three scenarios: 
- Scenario RCB: Change in rent-creating barriers in SMP sectors (from 
benchmark to post-Directive tariff equivalents, according to Table 1). 
- Scenario CCB: Change in cost-creating barriers in SMP sectors (from 
benchmark to post-Directive tariff equivalents, according to Table 1). 
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- Scenario PPR: Savings in public procurement, with an exogenous decrease in 
the prices paid, when purchasing the same physical amount of goods and 
services. 
 
3. 3. Simulation results 
The results from the above simulations on the main macroeconomic variables appear in 
Table 2. As can be seen, all the three simulated policies lead to significant increases in 
both Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and welfare (measured as Hicksian equivalent 
variations)1. Since prices would fall, both the real wage and real capital rental rates 
would increase, lowering employment and raising leisure, which would slightly increase 
the rate of unemployment. Finally, both exports and imports would increase in the RCB 
and PPR scenarios, and decrease in the CCB scenario. Overall, the trade balance would 
improve in the three scenarios. 
 
 Next, we present in tables 3 through 6 the results across sectors for some 
relevant variables. Regarding prices (Table 3), they would strongly decrease for the 
SMP sectors (especially Business services) in the RCB scenario, with small changes in 
the rest of sectors; similar but weaker effects would appear in the CCB scenario. In turn, 
the PPR scenario would show small decreases in prices for most sectors, higher in 
general for the SMP sectors. 
 
 The effects on sectoral output are shown in Table 4. In the RCB scenario, there 
would appear a fall in output for the SMP sectors (mostly occurring in Business services 
and, to a lower extent, in Wholesale and retail trade), coupled with a raise in output in 
the rest of sectors. On the contrary, the other two scenarios would register a generalized 
increase in output for all sectors, with the only exception of Agriculture and, especially, 
Other services, in the CCB and PPR scenarios, respectively. 
 
 Table 5 shows the changes in relative factor intensity, as measured by the 
capital/labour ratio. In the RCB scenario, all sectors would experience an increase in 
their relative capital intensity (with the only exceptions of Metal and machinery, and 
Energy and water), an effect that would be stronger in general for the SMP sectors. 
Conversely, in the CCB scenario the capital/labour ratio would fall in all sectors, except 
for the large increase in Business services and, much more slightly, in Wholesale and 
retail trade (i.e., two of the SMP sectors). In turn, in the PPR scenario the capital/labour 
ratio would experience a generalized fall in all sectors. 
 
 Finally, according to the results in Table 6, final consumption would raise in 
nearly all sectors, in the RCB and CCB scenarios. However, the situation would be very 
different in the PPR scenario, with final consumption experiencing significant decreases 
in some sectors, in particular Health, Education, Social work, and Community services. 
 
In the rest of this section we will sketch the main mechanisms driving the above 
results. 
 
Beginning with the RCB scenario, the decrease in rent-creating barriers would 
mean initially an exogenous relative decrease in the prices of the goods from SMP 
                                                 
1  Notice that the welfare result for the PPR scenario should be interpreted with caution, given that 
the size of the public sector has changed. 
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sectors, so that, ceteris paribus, the real rents of the productive factors would also fall. 
Accordingly, the SMP sectors would reduce their demand for both labour and capital. 
Since these sectors would be relatively capital-intensive (see the first column in Table 
5), and capital is fully employed, the rest of sectors would absorb the surplus of the 
primary factors, which would involve an increase in the relative price of labour (i.e., a 
Stolper-Samuelson effect). So, capital would be relatively cheaper, and most of the 
sectors would become more capital-intensive, which, ceteris paribus, would increase 
the output of non-SMP sectors and reduce that of SMP sectors.  
 
In turn, in the CCB scenario the decrease in the cost-creating barriers for the 
SMP sectors is modelled as an increase in labour productivity for these sectors. This 
greater labour productivity in the SMP sectors (in fact, only remarkable in Business 
services and, to a lower extent, in Wholesale and retail trade) represents a labour-saving 
technical change, which would increase their capital/labour ratio. This effect would 
lower the relative price of labour, so the capital/labour ratio of the non-SMP sectors 
would fall. On the other hand, the increase in labour productivity in any particular 
sector would lead, ceteris paribus, to a rise in total labour productivity that would 
translate into a biased expansion of the frontier of possibilities of production towards 
labour-intensive goods. If the goods’ relative prices would remain unchanged, the 
output of labour-intensive goods would increase, due the Rybczynski effect. However, 
as capital becomes relatively more expensive than labour, capital-intensive goods would 
become also relatively more expensive, so the rise in output would be less biased to 
labour-intensive goods (i.e., those from the non-SMP sectors). 
 
Lastly, in the PPR scenario public expenditure would be reduced. Final 
consumption would fall for some goods closely related to public sector activities (such 
as Community, Education, Health, and Social work services), which would be reflected 
in the performance of the related production sectors. This is the case of Other Services, 
a sector strongly linked with the goods purchased by the public sector, which would 
experience a significant fall in output. 
 
3. 4. Sensitivity analysis 
To conclude, we present a sensitivity analysis of the above results. Accordingly, we 
focus on the three main assumptions of the model: the matching unemployment rule, the 
large open economy assumption, and increasing returns to scale with a non-competitive 
price rule. In particular, we have tested a perfectly competitive labour market, the small 
open economy framework has been assumed for all sectors, and the productive sector 
has been modelled as perfectly competitive with a production technology of constant 
returns to scale. The effects on macroeconomic variables from changes in these three 
assumptions are shown in Table 7, as scenarios LAB, SOE and CRTS, respectively2. 
Though most of the results would be unchanged, in the LAB scenario there would be no 
unemployment, which gives a higher rise in welfare. In turn, in the SOE scenario both 
exports and imports would show higher increases in the RCB and PPR scenarios; 
whereas in the case of the CCB scenario exports would increase instead of decreasing, 
and the decrease in imports would be higher. Finally, the results from the CRTS 
scenario do not prove to be too different from those in Table 2, except for imports in the 
CCB scenario, which would be roughly unchanged instead of decreasing. Therefore, 
when analyzing the effects on particular variables from policies such as those included 
                                                 
2  The results in terms of sectoral variables are available from the authors upon request. 
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into the SMP, researchers and policymakers should be aware of the relevance of some 
other assumptions, in addition to those directly related to the foreign sector, such as the 
modelling of the labour market; the assumption of imperfect competition, however, 
does not seem to be so relevant for the final results.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The SMP was launched in the mid-1980s in order to eliminate any barriers still 
remaining within the EU, to the mobility of goods, services, labour, and capital. 
However, ten years after its envisaged completion, several restrictions still remain, in 
particular regarding trade services liberalization and the regulation of public 
procurement.  
 
In this paper we have provided an empirical assessment of two of the measures 
proposed in the areas where further advancements in the implementation of the SMP are 
still needed, namely, easing the provision of domestic and foreign services, and 
modifying the rules of public procurement, for the case of Spain. More specifically, 
three alternative policies have been simulated: in the case of services, an exogenous fall 
in the markup over costs (removal of rent-creating barriers), and an exogenous increase 
in productivity (removal of cost-creating barriers), for three particular sectors (which we 
termed SMP sectors); and, in the case of public procurement, an exogenous cut in 
public expenditure. To this end, we have built and simulated a CGE model, which 
incorporates three particular features: (i) increasing returns to scale and a non-
competitive price rule; (ii) sectoral export demand functions; and (iii) equilibrium 
unemployment according to a matching function approach. In any case, our objective 
was not trying to quantify exactly the effects of these particular policy measures on the 
performance of the Spanish economy, but rather trying to identify the main trends 
followed by some relevant variables and the major mechanisms influencing them. 
 
In general, the three policy shocks simulated in the model represented an 
improvement in resource allocation, leading to significant increases in GDP and 
aggregate welfare, with a positive effect on the trade balance. Prices would fall in most 
sectors, especially in the SMP sectors, so that both the real wage and real capital rental 
rates would increase. However, even though output would rise in most sectors, some of 
the sectors concerned (such as Business services or Other services) would experience a 
fall in output in some of the simulations. In addition, aggregate employment would fall, 
and leisure would rise, so slightly increasing the rate of unemployment.  
 
To conclude, notice that, despite the favourable outcomes of the policy measures 
analyzed in this paper, in terms of lower prices, and higher GDP and welfare, some 
negative effects could appear in those sectors more particularly concerned, even leading 
to harmful consequences in terms of unemployment. Therefore, some accompanying 
policies addressed to support those sectors and groups losing from these policies,  
would be in order. 
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Table 1. Tariff equivalents for rent- and cost-creating barriers: Spain and EU-25 
 
 Rent-creating barriers Cost-creating barriers 
 Domestic firms Foreign firms Domestic firms 
 Benchmark Post-
Directive 
Benchmark Post-
Directive 
Benchmark Post-
Directive 
Business 
services 
7.11  
(5.5) 
0.2  
(0.2) 
11.14 
(11.0) 
0.9  
(0.7) 
14.48   
(9.3) 
2.4  
(3.0) 
Communication 
services 
0.21 
(0.2) 
0.0  
(0.0) 
0.73 
(0.9) 
0.1  
(0.1) 
1.79  
(1.3) 
1.7  
(1.2) 
Wholesale and 
retail trade 
2.2  
(2.4) 
0.6  
(0.5) 
2.0  
(3.1) 
0.3  
(0.3) 
1.1  
(0.9) 
0.4  
(0.3) 
 
 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2005). 
Note: The values for EU-25 are given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Simulation results: Effects on macroeconomic variables  
(% change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  
RCB CCB PPR 
GDP 1.11 0.41 0.63
Welfare 5.30 4.59 4.90
Real wage rate 1.37 0.23 0.98
Real capital rental rate 1.05 0.70 0.43
Employment  -0.20 -0.14 -0.13
Unemployment rate 0.07 0.05 0.04
Exports 0.57 -0.12 0.22
Imports 0.35 -0.20 0.13
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Table 3. Simulation results: Effects on prices  
(% change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  
RCB CCB PPR 
Agriculture 0.59 0.33 0.39
Energy and water 0.19 0.07 0.08
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals -0.28 -0.19 -0.08
Metal and machinery -0.19 -0.21 -0.05
Other manufacturing 0.08 -0.01 0.18
Construction -0.10 -0.15 -0.05
Wholesale and retail trade -1.35 -0.11 0.02
Hotel and restaurant services 0.46 0.23 0.13
Communication services 0.07 0.04 -0.12
Financial intermediation services 0.11 -0.06 -0.24
Renting 0.61 0.37 -0.01
Business services -7.19 -3.78 -0.10
Other services 0.43 -0.05 -0.14
SMP sectors -3.24 -1.36 -0.17
Non-SMP sectors -0.00 0.14 -0.08
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Simulation results: Effects on output  
(% change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  
RCB CCB PPR 
Agriculture -0.06 -0.46 0.02
Energy and water 0.22 -0.07 0.40
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 1.34 0.38 0.51
Metal and machinery 1.85 0.57 1.01
Other manufacturing 0.65 0.10 0.37
Construction 1.55 0.70 0.66
Wholesale and retail trade -0.81 0.44 0.67
Hotel and restaurant services 0.43 0.13 0.55
Communication services 0.16 0.36 0.59
Financial intermediation services 0.00 0.45 0.26
Renting 0.40 0.26 0.61
Business services -7.13 2.22 0.37
Other services 0.05 0.08 -2.36
SMP sectors -2.15 0.87 0.56
Non-SMP sectors 0.73 0.25 0.01
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Table 5. Simulation results: Effects on the ratio capital/labour  
(Benchmark level and % change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  Benchmark 
level RCB CCB PPR 
Agriculture 5.97 0.10 -0.29 -0.06 
Energy and water 3.55 -0.02 -0.68 -0.99 
Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 1.07 0.00 -0.69 -0.81 
Metal and machinery 0.51 -0.04 -0.69 -0.74 
Other manufacturing 0.78 0.08 -0.69 -0.67 
Construction 0.69 0.11 -0.77 -0.67 
Wholesale and retail trade 1.79 0.11 0.01 -0.63 
Hotel and restaurant services 2.89 0.14 -0.69 -0.47 
Communication services 1.42 0.04 -0.71 -0.86 
Financial intermediation services 1.01 0.02 -0.70 -0.88 
Renting 25.90 0.08 -0.71 -0.75 
Business services 0.60 0.10 11.65 -0.78 
Other services 0.24 0.10 -0.70 -0.63 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Simulation results: Effects on final consumption 
(% change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  
RCB CCB PPR 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages 0.93 0.32 0.65
Tobacco and alcoholic beverages 1.34 0.49 2.58
Clothing and footwear 1.00 0.35 1.00
Housing 0.94 0.33 0.72
Home appliances 0.98 0.35 0.91
Health services 0.19 -0.04 -2.69
Transport services 1.09 0.39 1.39
Communication services 1.04 0.37 1.16
Recreational, cultural services 0.97 0.34 0.92
Education services 0.29 -0.06 -3.16
Hotel and restaurant services  0.95 0.33 0.75
Other consumption 0.98 0.34 0.87
Social work services 0.42 0.02 -2.36
Community services 0.12 -0.16 -4.14
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Table 7. Sensitivity analysis: Effects on macroeconomic variables  
(% change from benchmark) 
 
Scenarios  
RCB CCB PPR 
 LAB SOE CRTS LAB SOE CRTS LAB SOE CRTS 
GDP 1.10 1.16 1.08 0.41 0.42 0.40 0.63 0.65 0.62
Welfare 11.19 5.34 5.27 10.49 4.59 4.58 10.79 4.92 4.89
Real wage rate 1.37 1.44 1.33 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.98 1.01 0.97
Real capital rental rate 1.04 1.07 1.04 0.69 0.70 0.67 0.43 0.44 0.41
Employment  -0.21 -0.20 -0.20 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.12
Unemployment rate - 0.07 0.07 - 0.05 0.04 - 0.04 0.04
Exports 0.57 1.33 0.57 -0.12 0.13 -0.11 0.22 0.60 0.22
Imports 0.35 0.94 0.36 -0.20 -0.41 0.00 0.13 0.43 0.13
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Appendix. The model 
As a general rule, the notation in the model is as follows: endogenous variables are 
denoted by capital letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a bar, and 
parameters by small Latin and Greek letters. There are 13 (i, j = 1,…, 13) production 
sectors, where sectors 2 to 5 are exporters under the large open economy assumption; 
and there are 14 (k = 1,…, 14) consumption goods. All endogenous variables, and the 
exogenous variables and parameters, are listed in tables A1 and A2, respectively. The 
model’s equations are as follows. 
 
A. 1. Production 
The base model presents increasing returns to scale due to some fixed costs, and a non-
competitive pricing rule. Given that the upper nest is a Leontief function, the zero-profit 
condition for sector i is: 
 
PROFITi
X
= PXi 1− oiti( )− RKFi +W LFi( )NiXi − c0 iPVAi − cjiPOjj=1
13
∑ = 0    (i = 1,…, 13)     
(A1) 
where, according to the nested structure, the unit cost of the value added composite for 
sector i is a CES function: 
PVAi =
1
α i
ai
σi
LK
1+ soccei + soccwi( )1−σiLK W 1−σiLK + (1− ai )σiLK R1−σiLK( ) 11−σiLK  (i = 1,…, 13) 
(A2) 
 
We assume that the domestic producers maximize profits, and choose the 
optimal mix of domestic production and imports, and that of domestic sales and exports. 
This leads to the two zero-profit conditions: 
PROFITi
A
= PAi − ei
σi
A
PXi
1−σi
A
+ (1− ei )
σi
A
PFXFC( )1−σiA 
1
1−σi
A
= 0   (i = 1,…, 13)     (A3) 
PROFITi
CET
= PAi −
1
ζi
di
−εi POi
εi +1 + (1− di )
−εi PFXFC( )εi +1( )1εi +1 = 0  (i = 1, 6 to 13) 
(A4) 
PROFITi
CET
= PAi −
1
ζi
di
−εi POi
εi +1 + (1− di )
−εi PEXPi
εi +1( ) 1εi +1 = 0  (i = 2 to 5)    (A4’) 
These zero-profit conditions are used to get derived demand functions, by applying the 
Shepard’s Lemma on cost functions. 
 
Next, we introduce the corresponding market clearing equations, with demands 
and supplies showing in the left-hand and the right-hand side, respectively: 
Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂POj





 = II ji    (i, j  = 1,…, 13)              (A5) 
Ni KFi
i=1
13
∑ + Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂R



i=1
13
∑ = KRC + KG                (A6) 
Ni LFi
i=1
13
∑ + Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂W



i=1
13
∑ = L −Ql( )1−U( )                  (A7) 
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Ai −
∂PROFITiA
∂PXi




= Xi    (i = 1,…, 13)              (A8) 
Ai −
∂PROFITi A
∂FCi




= IMPi    (i = 1,…, 13)                (A9) 
Ai −
∂PROFITiCET
∂POi




= Oi    (i = 1,…, 13)    (A10) 
Ai −
∂PROFITiCET
∂FCi




= EXPi    (i = 1, 6 to 13)    (A11) 
Ai −
∂PROFITiCET
∂PEXPi




= EXPi    (i = 2 to 5)   (A11’) 
Xi + IMPi =Oi + EXPi    (i = 1,…, 13)    (A12) 
Ii + IIij
j=1
13
∑ +CFi = Oi     (i = 1,…, 13)    (A13) 
 
Finally, the markup function is: 
MARKUPi =
PXi 1+ oiti( )− c0iPVAi − cjiPOj
j=1
13
∑
PXi 1+ oiti( )  (i = 1,…, 13)                (A14) 
that corresponds to the Lerner index: 
MARKUPi =
Ωi
NiELASi
   (i = 1,…, 13)               (A15) 
with: 
ELASi = σ i
A
− σ i
A
−1( ) PXi Xi
PXi Xi
i=1
13
∑
  (i = 1,…, 13)               (A16) 
A. 2. Consumption 
The final demand functions are derived from the maximization of the representative 
consumer’s nested welfare function: 
( ) ( ) savsav savc QQWF ττ−= 1                    (A17) 
subject to the budget constraints: 
YRC =W L −Ql( )1−U( )+ RKRC + NTPS                      (A18) 
YRC = PsavQsav + PBk 1+ vatk( )CFBkRC
k=1
14
∑                  (A19) 
where the nests in the welfare function are defined by: 
Qc = b
σCL Qcg
1−σCL + (1− b)σ
CL
Ql
1−σCL( ) 11−σCL                  (A20) 
Qcg = CFBk
RC( )τk
k=1
14∏                     (A21) 
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The transformation from production goods into consumption goods follows a 
fixed coefficient structure: 
CFBk =
CF1
f1k
,...,
CF13
f13k




  (k = 1,…, 14)                (A22) 
and consumption goods are purchased by the representative consumer and the public 
sector: 
CFBk = CFBk
RC +CFBk
G   (k = 1,…, 14)                  (A23) 
 
 The solution to the maximization problem yields the demand functions for 
savings, leisure, and final demand. 
 
Finally, the demand for exports in the large open economy sectors is modelled 
through a constant-elasticity demand function such as: 
EXPi = PEXPi( )−µi    (i = 2 to 5)                (A24) 
 
A. 3. Public sector 
The income of the public sector is given by: 
YG = RKG + SOCCEi + SOCCWi +OITi( )
i=1
13
∑ + VATk
k=1
14
∑ − NTPS                (A25) 
where revenues come from several taxes: 
SOCCEi =Wsoccei Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂W




 (i = 1,…, 13)             (A26) 
SOCCWi =Wsoccwi Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂W




 (i = 1,…, 13)            (A27) 
OITi = PXi oiti Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂PXi




  (i = 1,…, 13)                (A28) 
VATk = PBkvatkCFBk     (k = 1,…, 14)      (A29) 
 
Due to the assumption of neutrality in the behaviour of the public sector, the 
macro closure rules are: 
BALPUB = SAVPUB − INVPUB                           (A30) 
CFBk
G
k=1
14
∑ = YG − SAVPUB         (A31) 
 
A. 4. Investment, savings, and foreign sector 
The macro closure of the model involve some other constraints related to investment 
and savings in the open economy: 
POi Ii
i=1
13
∑  = PINV INVTOTAL                               (A32) 
DIMPPFXEXPPFXFCEXPPEXPEXPPFX
i
i
i
i
i
ii =−++ ∑∑∑
===
13
1
13
6
5
2
1            (A33) 
PsavQsav + SAVPUB − PINV  INVTOTAL = D  FC              (A34) 
20 
 
A. 5. Factor markets 
To conclude, the equilibrium in the capital market is given in (A6), and the equilibrium 
in the labour market in (A7), with some restrictions related to the matching 
unemployment assumptions: 
W =W0
1
H
                (A35) 
H = 1−U( )
Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂W



i=1
13
∑
Xi −
∂PROFITi X
∂W



i=1
13
∑












η0
U
U




η1
    (A36) 
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Table A1. Endogenous variables  
 
Symbol Definition 
 
Ai Armington aggregate (total amount of goods supplied) of sector i 
CFi Final domestic consumption of goods produced by sector i 
CFBk Final domestic consumption of good k 
G
kCFB  Final public domestic consumption of good k 
RC
kCFB  Final private domestic consumption of good k 
ELASi Perceived elasticity of demand in sector i 
EXPi Exports of sector i 
FC Factor of conversion of foreign currency into domestic currency 
H Inverse of the premium on the reservation wage rate 
Ii Investment (gross capital formation) in goods produced by sector i 
IIij Intermediate inputs from sector j used by sector i 
IMPi Imports from sector i 
ITi Revenue from tariffs on imports from sector i 
MARKUPi Price-cost margin in sector i 
Ni Number of firms in sector i 
Oi Production of sector i sold in the domestic market 
OITi Revenue from other indirect taxes in sector i 
Psav Shadow price of savings 
PAi Unit cost of the Armington aggregate of sector i 
PBk Price of good k 
PEXPi Unit cost of exports of sector i 
PINV Unit cost of aggregate investment  
POi Unit cost of the production of sector i sold in the domestic market  
PROFITi
A  Unit profits for Ai (according to origin) 
PROFITi
CET  Unit profits for Ai (according to destination) 
PROFITi
X  Unit profits for Xi 
PVAi Unit cost of the primary factors used in sector i 
PXi Price of the goods produced by sector i 
Qc Demand for aggregate consumption 
Qcg Demand for aggregate consumption of goods 
Ql Demand for leisure 
Qsav Demand for savings 
R Capital rental rate 
SOCCEi Revenue from social contributions paid by employers of sector i 
SOCCWi Revenue from social contributions paid by employees of sector i 
U Unemployment rate  
VATk Revenue from the value added tax on good k 
W Wage rate 
W0 Reservation wage rate 
WF Welfare 
Xi Production of sector i 
YRC Disposable income of the representative consumer 
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Table A2. Exogenous variables and parameters 
 
Symbol Definition 
BALPUB  Balance of the public sector  
D  Trade balance surplus 
INVPUB  Investment of the public sector 
INVTOTAL  Total investment of the economy 
RCK  Capital endowment of the representative consumer 
GK  Capital endowment of the public sector 
KFi  Fixed requirements of capital in sector i 
L  Labour endowment 
LFi  
Fixed requirements of labour in sector i 
NTPS Net transfers from the public sector to the representative consumer 
PFX  World prices 
SAVPUB  Savings of the public sector 
U  Unemployment rate in the base year 
Xi  Effective production of sector i in the base year 
YG  Income of the public sector  
ai, bi, c0i, cji, di, ei, fik Share parameters  
oiti Other indirect taxes rates, ad valorem, in sector i 
soccei Social contributions rates, ad valorem, paid by employers in sector i 
soccwi  Social contributions rates, ad valorem, paid by employees in sector i 
vatk Value added tax rates, ad valorem, on good k 
iΩ  Conjectural variations parameter in sector i 
iα , iζ  Scale parameters  
iε  Elasticity of transformation in sector i 
0η , 1η  Externalities in the matching unemployment rule, from labour demand 
and unemployment 
µi  Elasticity of the demand for exports in sector i 
k
iσ  Armington elasticity of substitution in sector i 
CLσ  Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
LK
iσ  Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in sector i 
kτ , savτ  Share parameters 
 
 
